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Abstract
A locally causal hidden-variable theory of quantum physics need not
be constrained by the Bell inequalities if this theory also partially vio-
lates the measurement independence condition. However, such violation
can appear unphysical, implying implausible conspiratorial correlations
between the hidden-variables of particles being measured and earlier de-
terminants of instrumental settings. A novel physically plausible expla-
nation for such correlations is proposed, based on the hypothesis that
states of physical reality lie precisely on a non-computational measure-
zero dynamically invariant set in the state space of the universe: the
Cosmological Invariant Set Postulate. To illustrate the relevance of the
concept of a global invariant set, a simple analogy is considered where a
massive object is propelled into a black hole depending on the decay of a
radioactive atom. It is claimed that a locally causal hidden-variable theory
constrained by the Cosmological Invariant Set Postulate can violate the
CHSH inequality without being conspiratorial, superdeterministic, fine-
tuned or retrocausal, and the theory readily accommodates the classical
compatibilist notion of (experimenter) free will.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that a locally causal hidden-variable theory of quantum physics
need not be constrained by the Bell inequalities if this theory also violates the
measurement independence condition
ρ(λ|a, b) = ρ(λ|a′, b′) (1)
for all a, a′, b, b′. Here ρ(λ|a, b) denotes a probability density function over some
hidden-variable λ, conditional on the orientations of Alice and Bob’s measuring
apparatuses, represented by the points a and a′ (for Alice), and b and b′ (for
Bob), on the unit sphere. In fact, it may only be necessary to violate (11)
partially [7] [8], suggesting that this might be a fruitful area to explore in order
to create viable realistic causal theories of fundamental physics. However, an
important objection to any proposed violation of measurement independence
is that it can give rise to correlations that seemingly have no basis in physical
theory, suggesting some implausible conspiracy operating in the universe at
large.
Consider the example proposed by Bell himself [1] where a measurement ori-
entation is set by some pseudo-random number generator (PRNG). The output
of the PRNG is determined by, and depends sensitively on, some input variable.
For example, the value of the most significant digit of the output variable may
depend on the value of the millionth digit of the input variable. In Bell’s own
words:
. . . this particular piece of information is unlikely to be the vital
piece for any distinctively different purpose, i.e. is otherwise rather
useless.
Hence, if we seek to violate measurement independence, even partially, then we
must explain how the value of this millionth digit can somehow correlated with
the value of the hidden variable of the particles being measured. This becomes
especially problematic when we realise that the PRNG may be run months (or
indeed billions of years, see [6]) before the particles being measured are actually
produced as part of the experimental procedure. One proposal to explain such
correlations is retrocausality [16].
Here, an alternative and novel way to understand these correlations is pro-
posed, based on the concept of global invariant sets in state space, and fractal
invariant sets in particular. Importantly, local properties of such sets cannot be
determined by finite algorithm - they are formally non-computational. Whilst
generic to a broad class of nonlinear dynamical system, fractal invariant sets
are not especially familiar concepts to many quantum physicists and philoso-
phers. Hence, in Section 2, to illustrate the power of the global invariant set in
providing a new perspective on this long-studied problem, we consider a simple
analogy: a gedanken experiment in which, depending on whether a radioactive
atom decays, a massive object is fired into a black hole. We consider the tem-
poral correlation between the size of the black hole at t0, as determined by the
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radius of its event horizon H +(t0), and the (supposed) hidden variable of the
radioactive atom at t1. The existence of such a correlation, even when t0  t1,
is easy to understand (without conspiracy or retrocausality) if we take into ac-
count the fact that H + is a globally defined invariant subset of space time. In
particular, like the fractal invariant set, H +(t0)’s local properties cannot be
defined from the neighbouring space-time geometry near t0.
Two properties of fractal attracting invariant sets in state space are discussed
in Section 3: their non-computability, and the notion that such sets are, in a well
defined sense, ‘large’ when looked at from the inside, yet ‘small’ when looked
at from the outside. The key thesis which underpins the subsequent analysis
in this paper is then proposed: that states of physical reality lie precisely on
a (fractal) invariant set in the state space of the universe - the Cosmological
Invariant Set Postulate. In Section 4 it is shown how a development of these
ideas, referred to as Invariant Set Theory, can nullify the CHSH version of
the Bell Theorem, determinism and causality notwithstanding. In Section 5
it is shown that the proposed nullification suffers from none of the familiar
objections: it is not conspiratorial, it does not need retrocausality, the theory is
not superdeterministic or fine tuned, it is robust under small perturbations, and
experimenters are not prevented from measuring particle spins relative to any
direction they may wish to measure. Despite this, the Cosmological Invariant
Set Postulate is manifestly not classical. Based on the discussion in this paper,
in Section 6, some remarks are made about the relevance of the complex Hilbert
Space as a description of physical reality.
2 Schro¨dinger’s Black Cat
Consider the following simple gedanken experiment. If a given radioactive atom
decays (within a certain period of time) then a massive object - which could in
principle be a cat in a box - is propelled into a black hole. If the radioactive
atom does not decay, the massive object remains some distance from the black
hole in question.
The mass and hence size of the black hole are therefore dependent on the
decay of the radioactive atom. As shown in Fig 1, let the size of the black hole in
the case where the radioactive atom does not decay be equal to the radius r(t) of
the event horizon H +, where t labels a family of spacelike hypersurfaces which
intersectH +. Fig 1 shows a second null surface lying at a radius r′(t) > r(t). If
the radioactive atom does decay at time t1 then whilst for t < t1 it appears that
this null surface will escape to future null infinity, I +, in fact after the object
has fallen into the black hole, increasing its mass, this null surface becomes
trapped. The second null surface can be assumed to correspond to the event
horizon of the black hole in the case where the atom decays. Hence at t0 < t1
the size of the black hole is bigger if the atom decays at t1 than if it doesn’t.
If the mass of the ‘cat+box’ is large enough, then even at times t0  t1, it is
possible that r′(t0)  r(t0). In the conventional language of quantum theory
(assuming the whole system is unobserved) the black hole at the earlier time t0
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Figure 1: A massive object is propelled into a black hole if a radioactive atom
decays within a certain period of time around t1. Assuming some underpinning
hidden variable theory, the size of the black hole at t0 < t1 depends on whether
the radioactive atom decays and hence on the value of the atom’s hidden vari-
ables. If the size of the black hole could be estimated from the space-time
geometry in the neighbourhood of the black hole at t0, then this dependency
would appear to imply either some implausible conspiracy or some form of retro-
causality. However, since the size of the black hole is determined by the distance
of the event horizon H + from the centre of the black hole, and since H + is
itself defined by a global space-time condition (the boundary of null surfaces
that extend to I +), neither conspiracy or retrocausality is needed to explain
this dependency.
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must be considered a linear superposition of black holes of size r and r′. Here
we pursue the possibility that quantum physics is indeed underpinned by some
causal hidden-variable theory. Hence, let the decay of the radioactive atom at t1
be determined by the value of some hidden variable λ. Then, according to the
discussion above, the size of the black hole at t0 < t1 is both well-defined (i.e.
not a superposition of sizes) and correlated with λ at t1. Instead of a radioactive
atom decay, the release of the box could be determined by an experimenter. In
this case, the size of the black hole at t0 will be the result of experimenter
decision at t1.
A physicist who believed that the size of the black hole at t0 can be de-
termined from the space-time geometry in some neighbourhood of H + at t0
would be faced with a dilemma. Somehow, the black hole would have to ‘know’
to be the right size at t0 in order to anticipate the decay or non-decay of the
atom, or alternatively the experimenter decision, at t1. The apparent dilemma
is compounded by the fact that the photons which propagate on H + never
interact with the radioactive atom (or experimenter) at t1. To avoid requiring
some implausible conspiracy, the physicist may conclude that there may be a
retrocausal effect by which information, associated with the decay of the ra-
dioactive atom, propagates back in time causing the black hole event horizon to
expand at earlier times.
However, in this case there is a simple explanation for the correlation which
requires neither conspiracy nor retrocausality. The explanation lies in the fact
that H + is defined by a global property of space-time, it being the boundary
of null surfaces that escape to I +. Consistent with this, the location r(t0) of
H + cannot be determined by the geometry of space time in the neighbour-
hood of H + at t0. Hence, the correlation is explainable without conspiracy or
retrocausality.
3 Global Invariant Sets in State Space
Instead of the global geometric constructions in space-time, we now consider
global geometric constructions in state space.
Consider a dynamical system D : Xt0 → Xt0+t, defined, say, by a set of
differential equations X˙ = F [X]. An attracting invariant set ID is a closed
subset of the state space of D with the properties (see e.g. [19]):
• If Xt0 ∈ ID then Xt0+t ∈ ID for all t.
• ID attracts an open set of initial conditions. That is, there is an open
neighbourhood U containing ID such that if X(0) ∈ U , then the distance
from X(t) to ID tends to zero as t→∞. The largest such U is called the
basin of attraction of ID.
• There is no proper subset of ID having the first two properties.
Just as H + is a subset of space-time defined globally, so ID is a subset of
state space defined globally. One can readily give simple examples of dynamical
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systems with attracting invariant sets. Consider for example the dynamical
system whose evolution equations are
r˙ = r(1− r2) θ˙ = 1 (2)
in polar coordinates (r, θ). It is easily shown that all trajectories spiral asymp-
totically towards a limit cycle at r = 1. The attracting invariant set is the subset
of points where r = 1. More generally, there is a generic class of nonlinear dy-
namical systems where the attracting invariant sets are not such simple subsets,
but are fractal eg the Lorenz [11] attractor IL, derived from the equations
X˙ = −σX + σY
Y˙ = −XZ + rX − Y
Z˙ = XY − bZ (3)
where σ, r, b > 0. For such dynamical systems there is no formula defining
the invariant set. Consider then the question of determining whether a given
point in state space lies in IL. One may start with a state known to be in the
basin of attraction of IL. However, one would have to integrate the evolution
equations for an infinite time before one could be sure that the state had evolved
onto the invariant set. One would then integrate for a further time, comparing
the evolved state with the chosen point in state space, and stopping if the
two were identical. This cannot be achieved by a finite algorithm and one
must therefore conclude that the fractal invariant set is not computational.
More formally, Blum et al [3] have shown that for decision processes such as
this to be solved in finite time, the invariant set must have integral Hausdorff
dimension. By definition, fractal attracting invariant sets do not have integral
Hausdorff dimension. Dube [5] has shown that some of the classic problems
in computation theory that cannot be solved by algorithm, can be recast in
terms of fractal geometry. For example, the Post Correspondence Problem is
equivalent to that of determining whether a given line intersects the attracting
invariant set of an Iterative Function System.
A fractal invariant set can locally be considered the Cartesian product R×C
where C denotes some (multidimensional) Cantor set. The simplest example of
a Cantor Set is the ternary set T , based on the intersection of all iterates Tk,
where Tk comprises two copies of Tk−1, each copy reduced by a factor of 1/3.
Generalisations of T are needed to define invariant set geometries which exhibit
quantum probability structure [13] [14]. Key properties shared by all Cantor
sets are the following:
• Relative to the full measure of the Euclidean space in which they are
embedded, Cantor Sets have measure zero (i.e. are ‘small’ when looked at
from the outside).
• Despite this Cantor sets have the cardinality of the continuum (i.e. are
‘large’ when looked at from the inside.
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For example, elements of T can be represented by the numbers 0 ≤ r ≤ 1
whose base-3 expansion contain no digit ‘1’. The probability that a randomly
chosen number on the interval [0, 1] has such a base-3 expansion is equal to zero.
However, if we take the base-3 representation of a point in T and replace all
occcurrences of ‘2’ with the digit ‘1’, and then interpret that number as a real
number in binary form, it can be seen that there are as many points in T are
there are points in [0, 1]. The ternary set T can be readily generalised, firstly
be extending into multiple state-space dimensions (e.g. the Menger Sponge)
and secondly by considering restrictions on base-N rather than base-3 numbers,
where N > 3. In this way, for large enough N it is possible to construct
multidimensional fractals which, whilst still measure zero in their embedding
space, do not ’appear’ at all gappy (or lacunar [12]). These are relevant in the
discussion below. It should also be noted that a Cantor Set is an example of
what, mathematically, is referred to as a ’perfect set”. That is to say, given any
point of the Cantor Set and any neighbourhood of this point in the embedding
space contains another point of the Cantor Set - i.e. the Cantor Set has no
isolated points. This is relevant in the discussion about ‘superdeterminism’
below.
There is an important technique for reconstructing an attracting invariant
set using data from a (low-dimensional) dynamical system. It is based on the
notion that the dynamics in the full state space can be reconstructed from
measurements of just a single component of the state space [20]: The Takens
Embedding Theorem. The method is based on time delays. This fact has
important conceptual implications discussed later.
We apply these concepts to fundamental physics through the Cosmological
Invariant Set Postulate [13]: states of physical reality lie precisely on a fractal
attracting invariant set IU of measure zero in the state space of the universe
U , considered as a dynamical system. A crucial question to ask is: What
fundamental physical process could account for the attraction of neighbour-
ing state-space trajectories onto IU? Here we appeal to ideas put forward by
Roger Penrose (e.g. [15]), that the black hole no-hair theorem (and consequent
quantum black-hole information loss) should imply the existence of regions of
state-space trajectory convergence. The idea is illustrated schematically in Fig
2, which shows the trajectory of the universe in its state space over a cycle of an
assumed quasi-cyclic cosmology. By the Cosmological Invariant Set Postulate,
this trajectory lies precisely on IU . Shown in Fig 2 are regions of state space
(containing black holes) where neighbouring trajectories are converging onto IU .
It should be noted that these convergent trajectories do not lie on IU , leading
to some important new perspectives on the arrow of time problem that will be
addressed elsewhere.
4 The Bell Theorem
The relevance of the Cosmological Invariant Set Postulate to the Bell Theorem
can now be discussed. The key conceptual issues are related to the properties
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Figure 2: A schematic illustration of the evolving trajectory of the universe U in
its state space, within a quasi-cyclic cosmology. The Cosmological Invariant Set
Postulate states that these trajectories are evolving on a measure-zero fractal
attracting invariant subset IU which defines U ’s dynamical evolution. In regions
of state space containing black holes, the black hole no-hair theorem implies that
state space trajectories are convergent (consistent with discussions by Penrose
[15]).
in the two bullets above:
• IU is sufficiently small from the perspective of the embedding space that
the counterfactual experiments needed to establish the Bell inequality do
not lie on IU and therefore, by postulate, do not correspond to states of
physical reality.
• IU is sufficiently large that these restrictions do not pose any practical
constraints on which experiments experimenters might want to perform.
Related to this, the theory which arises out of the Cosmological Invariant
Set Postulate cannot be said to be ‘superdeterministic’ or fine tuned in
any meaningful sense.
Before discussing these issues in detail, a brief summary of some ongoing tech-
nical developments to describe the geometry of IU using algebraic techniques -
something referred to below as ‘invariant set theory’ (see [13] [14]).
4.1 Some Technical Preliminaries
As discussed above, locally, IU can be written as R×C where C is a Cantor Set.
That is to say, locally IU is a Cantor Set of trajectories, each trajectory repre-
senting a cosmological space-time. Using the language of symbolic dynamics [21]
and recognising Schwinger’s [18] symbolic algebraic approach to quantum me-
chanics, a theoretical framework is developed in [14] which defines a one-to-one
mapping (which, importantly, is not a surjection) between a symbolic represen-
tation of fractal trajectory bundles on IU and the (multi-qubit) complex Hilbert
Space of quantum theory.
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For one qubit, this correspondence can be written
Eαβ(000 . . . 0)
T ∼ cos θ
2
|0〉+ sin θ
2
eiφ |1〉 (4)
where Eαβ(000 . . . 0)
T is a bit string of length 2N comprising the symbols ’0’
and ’1’, N is a large but finite integer from which the fractal dimension of
IU is determined, and the superscript ‘T’ denotes matrix transpose. From the
perspective of Invariant Set Theory, the symbols ‘0’ and ‘1’ describe discrete
attracting subsets of IU ; from a quantum theoretic perspective these symbols
describe measurement outcomes1. From the perspective of Invariant Set The-
ory, the bit strings Eαβ(000 . . . 0) describe a bundle of trajectories belonging
to a particular fractal iterate, Ck of C; from a quantum theoretic perspective,
these bit strings define the sample spaces from which measurement probabili-
ties are defined. In Invariant Set Theory, Eαβ denotes a two parameter family
of negation/permutation operators acting on bit strings, with the multiplicative
property of quaternions (and hence Pauli Spin matrices). In particular, the fre-
quency of occurrence of the symbol ‘0’ in Eαβ(000 . . . 0)
T is equal to |1 − α/2|.
Importantly, α and β are only defined if their binary representations can be
expressed with less than N bits. In particular, Eαβ is undefined if either α or β
is irrational.
These numbers relate to complex Hilbert Space parameters through the re-
lationships
cos2 θ/2 = |1− α/2|
φ = piβ/2 (5)
Hence, the frequency of occurrence of the symbol ‘0’ in Eαβ(000 . . . 0)
T is equal
to cos2 θ/2, and, for example, the eigenstates |0〉 and |1〉 in quantum theory
correspond to the bit strings E0β(000 . . . 0) = (000 . . . 0) and E
2
β(000 . . . 0) =
(111 . . . 1) respectively. The fractal structure of IU becomes relevant when con-
sidering multiple sequential spin measurements. Since α and β must be express-
ible with N bits, so too must θ and φ. This means that according to Invariant
Set Theory, complex Hilbert Space vectors where either θ or φ is not describable
by N bits (e.g. are irrational) do not correspond to a sample space of trajec-
tories on the invariant set IU , and therefore, by the Cosmological Invariant Set
Postulate, do not corresponds to a sample space comprising elements of physical
reality. Put another way, such Hilbert Space vectors describe physically unreal
counterfactual experiments.
The relationship (4) can be readily extended to M ≥ 1 qubits, corresponding
to M bit strings based on multiple copies of the quaternion operators Eαβ . We
refer the reader to reference [14] for details.
We can now discuss how precisely invariant set theory fails to be constrained
by the Bell inequality, and the CHSH [4] version of it in particular (similar
arguments apply to an analysis of the original Bell inequalities [13]).
1In [14] these attracting subsets are considered state-space manifestations of gravitational
‘clumpiness’ - thus linking Invariant Set Theory to descriptions of quantum measurement as
a fundamentally gravitational process
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4.2 CHSH
Alice and Bob each have a measuring device which has two orientation settings
(a1 and a2 for Alice, and b1 and b2 for Bob) and two ’outputs’ say ±1. Let the
orientations a1, a2, b1 and b2 be represented by four points on the unit sphere
(see Fig 3). A conventional causal hidden-variable theory is constrained by the
CHSH inequality
|CorrΛ(a1, b1)− CorrΛ(a1, b2)|+ |CorrΛ(a2, b1) + CorrΛ(a2, b2)| ≤ 2 (6)
where each correlation is defined by
CorrΛ(ai, bj) =
∑
k
A(ai, λk)B(bj , λk) (7)
where A = ±1 and B = ±1 denote deterministic (hidden-variable) functions
and Λ = {λk}. As is well known, according to experiment and consistent
with quantum theory, with a1 ≈ 0◦, a2 ≈ 90◦, b1 ≈ 45◦, b2 ≈ 135◦, then
the left hand side of (6) sums to about 2.8, in clear violation of (6). Does
a causal hidden-variable theory constrained by the Cosmological Invariant Set
Postulate necessarily obey the CHSH inequality? According to the discussion
above, for Invariant Set Theory to necessarily obey the CHSH inequality, then
the cosine of the angular distance between any pair of the four points a1, a2, b1, b2
must be describable by O(N) bits. If this is possible, then the sample spaces
which generate the correlations CorrΛ(a1, b1),CorrΛ(a1, b2),CorrΛ(a2, b1) and
CorrΛ(a2, b2) can be associated with bit strings of the type {a1, a2, . . . a2N },
where ai ∈ {0, 1}, and the symbol 0 denotes a situation where A×B = 1 (Alice
and Bob agree) and the symbol 1 denotes a situation where A×B = −1 (Alice
and Bob disagree).
However, it is not the case that the cosine of the angular distance between all
pairs of points a1, a2, b1, b2 are base-2 rational (and hence cannot be describable
by N bits). To see this, first of all note that cos θa1a2 must be describable
by N bits (where θa1a2 denotes the relative orientation between a1 and a2).
The reason for this is that it is possible for Alice to measure the spin of a
particle with her apparatus oriented with respect to a1, and, with the spin
now prepared in the a1 direction, to measure the same particle again with the
apparatus oriented in the a2 direction. For an experiment where a particle is
prepared in the state associated with a1 and measured in the state associated
with a2, then according to Invariant Set Theory, cos θa1a2 must be describable
by N bits. Similarly, cos θb1b2 must be describable by N bits.
As discussed below, Alice and Bob can be considered, for all practical pur-
poses, free agents. Therefore they can choose, without constraint, any of the
following possibilities {a1, b1}, {a1, b2}, {a2, b1}, {a2, b2}. Each of these choices
can be associated with a possible invariant set IU1 , IU2 , IU3 or IU4 respectively.
Suppose, without loss of generality, Alice and Bob (independently) choose a1
and b1 respectively, implying that cos θa1b1 is describable by N bits. By the
cosine rule for spherical triangles
cos θa2b1 = cos θa1a2 cos θa1b1 + sin θa1a2 sin θa1b1 cosφ (8)
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Figure 3: a1, a2, b1, b2 are four points on the sphere, representing directions
associated with measurement orientations from which the left hand side of the
CHSH inequality (6) can be estimated. We focus on a particular λ ∈ Λ. The
angular length between ai and bj be θai,bj . According to Invariant Set Theory, in
order that CorrΛ(aibj) in (6) be definable, then cos θaibj must be base-2 rational.
As discussed in the text cos θa1a2 and cos θb1b2 are necessarily base-2 rational.
Then, using the cosine rule for spherical triangles, it is impossible for the sides
of any of the spherical triangles whose apexes are drawn from {a1, a2, b1, b2} to
all have angular lengths whose cosines are base-2 rational. Based on this, the
left hand side of the CHSH inequality is not definable from a common sample
space of hidden variables, and Invariant Set Theory is therefore not constrained
by the CHSH inequality.
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where 0 < φ < pi/2 is the (typically small) angle subtended by the two sides
of 4a1a2b1 at a1 and φ/pi is describable by N bits (see Fig 3). Now the first
term on the right hand side of (8) is the product of two terms, each of which
is describable by N bits. Hence the product is base-2 rational. However, by a
simple number theorem, cosφ cannot be base-2 rational. Hence the left hand
side of (8) cannot be base-2 rational, and in particular cannot not describable
by N bits, no matter how big is N . The theorem is:
Theorem[9]. Let φ/pi ∈ Q. Then cosφ /∈ Q except when cosφ = 0,±1/2,±1.
Proof . We derive a reductio ad absurdum. Assume that 2 cosφ = a/b is
rational, where a, b ∈ Z, b 6= 0 have no common factors. Using the identity
2 cos 2φ = (2 cosφ)2 − 2 we have
2 cos 2φ =
a2 − 2b2
b2
(9)
Now a2 − 2b2 and b2 have no common factors, since if p were a prime number
dividing both, then p|b2 =⇒ p|b and p|(a2 − 2b2) =⇒ p|a, a contradiction.
Hence if b 6= ±1, then the denominators in 2 cosφ, 2 cos 2φ, 2 cos 4φ, 2 cos 8φ . . .
get bigger and bigger without limit. On the other hand, with 0 < φ/pi < 1/2 ∈
Q, then φ/pi = m/n where m,n ∈ Z have no common factors. This implies
that the sequence (2 cos 2kφ)k∈N admits at most n values. Hence we have a
contradiction. Hence b = ±1 and cosφ = 0,±1/2,±1. QED.
Hence if in reality Alice chooses setting a1 and Bob chooses setting b1 when
measuring the spins of a particle pair described by the hidden-variable λ, then
the actual invariant set is IU1 , and a counterfactual universe where Alice chooses
setting a2 and Bob chooses setting b1 lies off IU1 . Conversely, if in reality Alice
chooses a2 and Bob b1, then the invariant set is IU3 and a counterfactual universe
where Alice instead chooses a1 and Bob b1 lies off IU3 . In general, only two of
the four correlations in (6) are definable for given λ, no matter what choices
Alice and Bob make.
If only two of the four correlations are defined for any λ, what happens when
experiments show that the inequalities are violated? The key point that distin-
guishes experimental procedure from the theoretical analysis above is that in an
experimental test of the CHSH inequality the four correlation functions in (6)
are evaluated using four separate sub-experiments (implying four disjoint sets
of hidden variables). According to Invariant Set Theory, each sub-experiment
must be associated with a state of the universe on an invariant set IU , i.e. the
cosines of the relative angles must all be definable by N bits. That is to say,
according to Invariant Set Theory, what is actually tested experimentally is not
(6) but something of the form
|CorrΛ1(a1, b1)− CorrΛ2(a′1, b2)|+ |CorrΛ3(a2, b′1) + CorrΛ4(a′2, b′2)| ≤ 2 (10)
where Λ1 6= Λ2 6= Λ3 6= Λ4. Here a′1 = a1, a′2 = a2, b′1 = b1 and b′2 = b2
to within the necessarily finite precision of the measuring instruments, such
that all of cos θa1b1 , cos θa′1b2 , cos θa2b′1 and cos θa′2b′2 are describable by N bits.
By contrast, the theoretical analysis described above, necessary to determine
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whether a given hidden-variable theory is constrained by the CHSH inequality,
considers different measurement orientations for a given λ, a situation which
can never arise in an experimental test of the CHSH inequality.
In summary, the reason Invariant Set Theory can violate the CHSH inequal-
ities is through a violation of the measurement independence condition (11), in
particular that
ρ(λ|aˆ, bˆ) = ρ(λ|aˆ, bˆ′) (11)
where the cosine of the angle between a and b is not describable by N bits (e.g.
is not dyadic rational), but the cosine of the angle between a and b′ ≈ b is. An
immediate reaction to such a conclusion might be that such a violation would
not be robust to the tiniest perturbation. We discuss this in Section 5.1 below,
showing it is not so.
It can be considered an open question as to whether all demonstrations of
quantum non-locality are nullified in Invariant Set Theory by the incommen-
surateness of φ and cosφ. However, given the general applicability of such
incommensurateness to the realistic interpretation of a range of quantum phe-
nomena - interference, sequential Stern-Gerlach, and the original Bell inequality
(see [14]) - we speculate here that this question can be answered in the positive.
5 Fine Tuning, Conspiracy, Free Will and Su-
perdeterminism
It is claimed above that the Bell Inequalities can be violated without resorting to
a breakdown of realism or local causality. What are the conceivable objections to
Invariant Set Theory as a description of physical reality? We list four: it is fine-
tuned, inimical to experimenter free will, conspiratorial or superdeterministic.
In this section it is shown that invariant set theory is none of these.
5.1 Fine Tuning
The analysis above suggests that it might be sensitive to tiny perturbations
(experimenter hand shake for example). However, this is not the case. We
return to one of the basic properties of a Cantor Set, that it is ‘large’ (i.e. has
the cardinality of the continuum) when looked at from the inside. That is to
say, the analysis above is insensitive to perturbations which keeps a trajectory
on the invariant set. There is a continuum of such perturbations. Indeed, one
can perform continuous analysis on IU making use of the link to p-adic numbers.
For example, there is a well-known continuous 1-1 mapping between the dyadic
integers ...d2d1d0 and the points 0.e0e1e2 of the Cantor Ternary set, by the
relationship en = 2dn [17].
On the other hand, the analysis is sensitive to noise which is random with
respect to the measure of the euclidean space in which IU is embedded - such
noise will surely take a state on IU to a state off it, no matter how small the noise
actually is. However, since by the Cosmological Invariant Set Postulate, only
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those perturbations which maps points of IU to points of IU can be considered
physical, then such full-measure noise is not physical.
In this sense, the experimenter can certainly have a degree of hand shake.
This will mean that parameters like θ in the discussion above are (epistemically)
uncertain, and can be expected to vary during an experiment within some finite
tolerance ∆θ. However, according to Invariant Set Theory, this uncertainty
notwithstanding, the actual values of the parameter θ occurring within this
finite tolerance must all be describable by N bits.
5.2 Conspiracy
Let us return to Bell’s example (see Section 1) where the orientation of a mea-
surement device is set by the output of a PRNG, itself sensitive to the value
of the millionth digit of some input variable. Let us suppose the PRNG is run
at t = t0, and the actual experiment takes place at t = t1. In principle (like
the black-hole experiment), let us assume that t0  t1. Now let us denote by
A Bell’s assertion (cf Section 1) that the value of the millionth digit is unim-
portant for any distinctly different purpose. Then, if A is true, there can be
no rational reason to suppose the value of the millionth digit at t0 should be
correlated with the hidden variables associated with the particles whose spin is
subsequently measured by Alice and Bob at t1 (unless one invokes retrocausal-
ity).
However, assuming the Cosmological Invariant Set Postulate, there are three
related ways of seeing that A is false.
• Consider an ensemble of putative states XU (d) of the Universe at t0.
By construction, suppose XU (d) are identical except for the value d ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . . 9} of the millionth decimal digit of the input variable to the
PRNG. If IU is fractal, then it is impossible to determine by finite al-
gorithm started at t0, the value of d which ensures XU (d) ∈ IU . The
situation is fundamentally no different to that of the black-hole gedanken
experiment. Similar to the discussion in Section 3, the value d of the mil-
lionth digit for which XU (d) ∈ IU is determined by events in the future
of t0, (a crucial) one of which will be the settings of the experiment to
measure the spin of the particle pair at t1.
• Consider the implication of the Takens Embedding Theorem referred to
in Section 3. In principle (but not in practice!) the entire invariant set
IU could be reconstructed in state space, given sufficiently many values of
the millionth digit of the input to the PRNG (over multiple aeons of the
universe). This directly contradicts A’s assertion that the values of the
millionth digits are irrelevant for all distinctively different purposes.
• Suppose the millionth digit was the number 8 and consider a counter-
factual universe in which all degrees of freedom are kept fixed except for
one, where the number 8 was perturbed to the number 9, taking U → U ′.
Whilst U ∈ IU , one cannot assume that U ′ ∈ IU , since IU has measure zero
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in its embedding space. Above we have shown that at least some of the
counterfactual measurement orientations needed to establish the CHSH
inequality necessarily lie off IU . Hence, states of the universe where the
value of the millionth digit would have led to such counterfactual mea-
surement orientations, rather than the actual measurement orientations,
necessarily lie off IU .
5.3 Free Will
Alice and Bob can be said to have free will if they can hold rational beliefs
that the future ‘is up to them’. Holding a rational belief means that there is
nothing that disprove such a belief. However, it doesn’t mean that the rational
belief is actually true. Here we take a ‘classical compatibilist’ view [10] (whose
proponents include notable philosophers such as Hobbes, Hume and Mill) that
Alice and Bob are ‘free’ when there is an absence of constraints or impediments
preventing them from doing what they want to do. In the analysis of the CHSH
experiment above, there are certainly no ‘knowable’ constraints at the time
when the experiment is performed, which prevent them from selecting any of
the combinations {a1, b1}, {a1, b2}, {a2, b1}, {a2, b2}. This is consistent with
the non-computability of IU . Alice and Bob will makes their choices on the
basis of what they want to measure, this notion of ‘want’ being determined by
actions of the neurons in their brains, processes which themselves act out on
the invariant set. Having made that choice, say {a1, b1}, then two of the three
remaining pairs of values can, retrospectively, be said to not lie on IU . Hence
the counterfactuals in which measurements along these off IU directions are not
physical.
In summary, according to the classical compatibilist view, the experimenters
are free agents, determinism and the Cosmological Invariant Set Postulate notwith-
standing. That is to say, they can hold rational beliefs that they really do ‘con-
trol’ the settings (in the sense that they could have done otherwise), whereas
in reality they do not (and, for some alternative settings, could not have done
otherwise).
5.4 Superdeterminism
The word ‘superdeterminism’ is generally used to denote a class of theories
in which the measurement independent condition 11 is violated. The word is
generally used in a pejorative sense, with the implication that it such a theory
is necessarily conspiratorial and denies free will. As shown above, Invariant Set
Theory is not conspiratorial and does not deny free will. In this Section, we
attempt a mathematical definition of the notion of superdeterminism and assess
whether Invariant Set Theory can itself be considered superdeterministic.
By definition, a superdeterministic theory is more restrictive than a deter-
ministic theory - but how? A superdeterministic theory must not only have
deterministic laws of evolution (e.g. in the form X˙ = F [X]), it must also
impose some restrictions on allowed initial states X(t0). Consider the set of
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Figure 4: Invariant Set Theory would be superdeterministic if for a point p ∈ IU
there exist (sufficiently small) neighbourhoods N of p, transverse to the state-
space trajectory on IU , which contain no other points of IU . Because IU is
locally the Cartesian product of the real line and a Cantor set, and because a
Cantor set is a perfect topological set (with no isolated points), there exist (an
infinity of) points where p′ ∈ N and p′ ∈ IU . Hence Invariant Set Theory is not
superdeterministic.
state-space perturbations to X(t0), which are transverse to the (integral curve)
trajectory of X˙ = F [X] from X(t0) (see Fig 4). If any such perturbation to
an allowed X(t0) produces an initial state forbidden by the theory, i.e. if X(t0)
was a completely isolated point in all transverse neighbourhoods of X(t0), no
matter how large, then of course it would be reasonable to say that such a theory
is superdeterministic. However, this is an unnecessarily strong restriction and
instead we will take a much weaker definition of superdeterminism: a determin-
istic theory is superdeterministic iff there exists a transverse neighbourhood of
X(t0) (no matter how small) comprising only forbidden states.
According to this weak definition, Invariant Set Theory is not superdeter-
ministic. By the Cosmological Invariant Set postulate, states of the universe
evolve on a fractal invariant set in state space - locally the product of a Cantor
set and the real line. A Cantor set is a so-called ‘perfect’ topological set. Any
neighbourhood of a point of a perfect set contains other points of the set, i.e. a
perfect set contains no isolated points. Hence all transverse neighbourhoods of
an allowed initial state contain allowed initial states.
Superdeterministic theories are rightly seen as unacceptable by physicists
and philosophers. Most importantly, they offer no theoretical framework for
defining the notion of probability (which is central to quantum theory). As
such, they offer no theoretical framework to understand why the world is gov-
erned by quantum probability and not classical probability. This problem can
be framed in the following way: if the world is indeed causal and deterministic
(as a superdeterministic world could indeed be), how can we explain that the
vast majority of quantum physicists have been fooled into believing otherwise.
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However as discussed, a fractal invariant set is not superdeterministic. In par-
ticular, any transverse neighbourhood of any state on IU contains an infinite
number of states, also lying on IU . From the statistics of these alternative
states we can construct the notion of probability (and quantum probability in
particular).
6 Conclusions
We have presented a new approach to formulating a locally causal hidden-
variable theory of quantum physics, in which the measurement independence
condition is partially violated without conspiracy, superdeterminism, retrocausal-
ity, fine-tuning and without denying experimenter free will. The key ingredient
in this approach is the global invariant set; more specifically the notion that
globally defined invariant subsets of state space define the notion of physical
reality. Such subsets are generic in nonlinear dynamical systems theory, but are
less familiar to quantum physicists and philosophers. To try to make accessible
the reasoning why such subsets do provide a novel solution to the problem of
quantum non-locality, we considered a simple black-hole gedanken experiment
- the event horizon in space-time being the analogy of the invariant set in state
space. The fundamental postulate underlying the analysis in this paper is the
Cosmological Invariant Set Postulate, that states of the universe U are evolving
precisely on a global measure-zero fractal invariant set, IU in state space.
Recently, a proposal was made to close the measurement independence ‘loop-
hole’ by setting measurement orientations from the light of distant quasars [6].
Because the light originated so early in the universe, and because the cosmic
sources have never been in causal contact with one another, it seems improbable
(in line with Bell’s reasoning about the PRNG) that this light could in any way
be correlated with the hidden variables of particle source in an experiment being
conducted today. However, by analogy with the black hole event horizon, it is
shown that the cosmological invariant set is an atemporal one. The fact that
the light was emitted billions of years before the experiment took place is really
a ‘red herring’. It is therefore predicted that if these proposed experiments are
conducted, Bell’s inequalities will continue to be violated.
This experiment draws to attention the notion that if quantum theory can
be replaced by a deeper causal deterministic theory, that theory must treat cos-
mology and quantum physics much more synergistically than is done in contem-
porary theories of physics. This in turn suggests that the long-sought unification
of gravitational and quantum physics should also be based on the development
of a more synergistic relationship between cosmology and quantum physics than
exists today.
We conclude with some remarks about the implications of the discussions
above on the physical nature of the central mathematical structure in quantum
theory: the complex Hilbert space. A vector space is a rudimentary algebraic
structure defined over a field, the field of complex numbers in the case of the
complex Hilbert Space. The set of elements of a field is by definition closed
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over addition and multiplication. However, in terms of the correspondence (4),
cos θ and φ/pi are restricted to rational numbers describable by fixed finite N
bits. Hence, the set of corresponding numbers cos θ is not in general closed
under multiplication, and the set of corresponding numbers eiφ is not in gen-
eral closed under addition, no matter how large is N . Hence the set of vectors
corresponding to bit strings describable in Invariant Set Theory is not a vector
space, no matter how large is N . Is this a problem? Whilst it is appealing to be
able to describe all elements of a physical theory by rudimentary mathematical
structures, as a physicist one should not be overly beguiled by the elegance of
any particular mathematical structure. In particular, the property of closure
guarantees that all conceivable counterfactual worlds have equal ontological sta-
tus, the antithesis of that implied by the Cosmological Invariant Set Postulate.
Hence we claim that closure can be an undesirable feature of theory if one strives
for causal realism in physics. In particular, we reject the algebraic properties of
the complex Hilbert Space as a description of physical reality and speculate that
the unquestioning acceptance of these properties over the years has hindered the
development of physical theory (the unification of quantum and gravitational
physics in particular). In terms of Invariant Set Theory, the complex Hilbert
space should be treated as the singular and not the regular limit of the set of bit
string representations, as the parameter 1/N tends to zero. As Berry has noted
[2], old physical theories generically arise as the singular limit of new physical
theories.
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